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The Impact of Shareholder Control on Bondholders 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper investigates the effect of shareholder control on bondholder wealth. While stronger 
shareholder control can benefit bondholders by disciplining managers, it also increases the 
likelihood of events that can hurt bondholders, e.g. hostile takeovers. We hypothesize that 
shareholder control can have contrasting effects on bond yields depending on the takeover 
vulnerability of a firm. Using the presence of an institutional blockholder to proxy for shareholder 
control and firm-level anti-takeover provisions to proxy for takeover vulnerability, we find that 
shareholder control is associated with lower yields if the firm is protected from takeovers. We 
also find that shareholder control is associated with higher yields if the firm is exposed to 
takeovers. The contrasting effects of shareholder control on yields are the strongest for firms that 
are small and have low leverage. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond 
yields due to differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 93 basis points. Further, the 
results are insignificant for a sub-sample of firms where the bondholders are protected from 
takeovers through the poison put covenant. Bond ratings also appear to incorporate a similar 
effect of shareholder control on bondholders Finally, we find that a bond pricing model that does 
not account for shareholder control generates an annualized abnormal return of 1% to 1.4% for 
portfolios that long firms with both strong shareholder control and high takeover vulnerability 
and short firms without either shareholder control or takeover vulnerability. Combined, these 
results suggest that the use of different governance mechanisms, such as shareholder monitoring 
and takeover vulnerability, depends on a firm’s capital structure and that bond-pricing models 
should account for shareholder control. 
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“Generalized implications for creditors of companies that have controlling shareholders are 
not clear to us at this point. While there is substantial overlap between creditor and 
shareholder interests, there also are important potential conflicts.” 
 
- Moody’s ‘Rating Methodology’ (2003) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In their survey, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) broadly term corporate governance as 
‘the ways through which suppliers of capital to corporations assure themselves of getting 
a return on their investment’. The Anglo-Saxon view of corporate governance has mainly 
focused on transparency and strengthening shareholder rights; as witnessed by the recent 
governance reforms in the US and the UK.1 Since shareholders are, by virtue of their 
contract, the residual claimants of the firm cash flows, in this view higher shareholder 
vigilance automatically benefits bondholders – the other major supplier of capital - by 
reducing chances of bankruptcy due to managerial self-dealing. However, stronger 
shareholder control can also exacerbate the conflict between shareholders and other 
claimholders. This paper investigates the effect of stronger shareholder control on 
bondholders by not only considering the benefits but also potential costs and sheds light 
on the design of firm-level corporate governance.  
Strengthening shareholders rights could hurt bondholders by increasing the 
likelihood of scenarios that benefit shareholders; some of which might entail losses for 
the bondholders. 2  More specifically, if shareholder control results in an increase in 
leverage (as in Leveraged Buyouts), existing bondholders stand to lose. Higher leverage 
can reduce the value of outstanding bonds both by increasing the probability – and the 
deadweight costs – of a possible future bankruptcy and by reordering the priority of 
claims in bankruptcy. Even if a bond has priority covenants that prevent the firm from 
issuing bonds of equal or higher seniority, these priority rules are not completely upheld 
in the case of financial distress (see e.g. Franks and Torous (1989)). 3  Therefore, an 
increase in leverage is likely to hurt bondholders unless the benefits of increasing 
leverage (e.g., reducing theft by reducing free cash flow (Jensen, 1990)) are large. 
                                                 
1
 See for example Black (1998), Coates et. al. (2002), Bebchuk (2004) and the  Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002. 
2
 An alternative reason why bondholders might be hurt could be due to wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders through asset substitution or risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We find weak 
evidence of this channel.  See section 6 for a discussion.  
3
 Weiss (1990) and Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) present more evidence supporting violations of 
absolute priority rules. 
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Important examples of events where shareholders might gain and bondholders might lose 
are acquisitions and disciplinary takeovers, especially since it has been shown that on an 
average leverage significantly increases after a takeover (Kim and McConnell, 1977, 
Cook and Martin, 1991, Ghosh and Jain, 2000). An extreme example of such an event is 
a Leveraged Buyout. Using trader quoted data, Warga and Welch (1993) show that 
bondholder losses range on average between 6-7% on Leveraged Buyout 
announcements.4,5 
Since takeovers become more likely with stronger shareholder control (Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986)), a consequence of strengthening shareholder control and better aligning 
managers to shareholders could be to increase the likelihood of bondholder losses.6 As a 
result, stronger shareholder control can have both a beneficial (higher managerial 
discipline) and a detrimental effect (greater chances of leverage-increasing takeovers) on 
bondholders. Whether the net effect of stronger shareholder rights is beneficial or 
harmful depends on firm characteristics and is an empirical issue. 
In this paper, we attempt to answer this question by first developing the hypothesis 
that firm-specific factors are likely to influence both benefits and costs of strong 
shareholder rights for bondholders, and then investigating how bond yields, ratings and 
returns vary with differing levels of shareholder control. We use a simple framework to 
capture both the positive and negative effects that shareholder control has on bondholder 
wealth to generate three specific hypotheses that we test. To proxy for strong shareholder 
control, we use the presence of an institutional blockholder (i.e., with equity ownership 
greater than 5%). To proxy for a firm’s exposure to the market for corporate control we 
consider charter-level takeover defense provisions.  
Our main hypothesis is that shareholder control is beneficial for bondholders only 
when the firm is protected from takeovers. When the firm is exposed to takeovers, the 
benefits are offset by the now higher exposure to hostile takeovers. Thus the net effect of 
strong shareholder control is more likely to be harmful for bondholders of firms that are 
prone to takeovers. In addition to takeover protection, a larger firm size and higher 
                                                 
4
 They also show that bondholder losses only account for a small fraction of the shareholder gains. 
5
 In a more general setting of all mergers and acquisitions in the 80’s and the 90’s, Billet, King and Mauer 
(2003) consider the impact of takeovers on bondholder wealth. Although this study does not separate 
disciplinary takeovers from mergers and takeovers for managerial interests, it shows that when takeovers 
are accompanied by an increase in asset risk or reduction in credit rating of the target firm, the bondholders 
of the target firm lose.   
6 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that even if a firm is exposed to the market for corporate control, 
disciplinary takeovers are unlikely to occur if the shareholders are dispersed. Thus, a blockholder is 
essential, in addition to low takeover defense to make a firm truly vulnerable to takeovers. 
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leverage (see e.g. Stulz, 1988, Harris and Raviv, 1988, Zweibel, 1997, and Novaes and 
Zingales, 1995) also reduces the  takeover vulnerability of a firm and thus affects the 
impact of shareholder control on bondholders. Therefore, we also posit that shareholder 
control is more likely to be beneficial in firms that are large or/and have high leverage. 
We find strong support for these hypotheses using bond yields of an average of 1839 
issues per year from 1990 to 1997. We find that shareholder control is associated with 
lower yields if the firm is protected from takeovers. We also find that shareholder control 
is associated with higher yields if the firm is exposed to takeovers. The contrasting 
effects of shareholder control on yields are the strongest for firms that are small and have 
low leverage. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to 
differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 93 basis points.   
We also provide strong evidence that this effect is important in bond pricing models. 
Specifically, we show that a portfolio that buys bonds of firms with strong shareholder 
control and high takeover vulnerability and shorts bonds of firms with neither high 
shareholder control nor takeover vulnerability generates an abnormal return of up to 1.3%. 
This abnormal return is higher for firms that are small and have low leverage and can be 
as high as 2.5%. Finally, bond ratings appear to incorporate a similar effect of 
shareholder control on bondholders.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that shows that shareholder rights 
can have divergent and economically important effects on bondholders. In contrast to 
most of the literature investigating the effect of shareholder control and firm decisions on 
bondholders, we focus on yields, ratings and long run bond returns instead of analyzing 
bondholder wealth changes around certain events associated with bondholder losses, e.g. 
looking at spin-offs (Maxwell and Rao, 2003), takeovers and seasoned equity offerings.  
In doing so, we also analyze how different governance mechanisms interact to affect 
bond returns, yields and ratings. This complements the study by Cremers and Nair (2003), 
which looks at the interaction of various governance mechanisms using equity prices and 
accounting cash flows. We also highlight the importance of using shareholder control in 
bond pricing models. To do so, we also apply the long run event study methodology used 
in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003, henceforth GIM) and Cremers and Nair (2003) for 
equity prices to bonds. This approach, new in the literature on bondholder wealth effects, 
helps us understand how bondholders price in the effects of greater shareholder control 
and how these bond prices change over time. Finally, we shed light on the relative 
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importance of risk-shifting and takeovers in the conflict between shareholders and 
bondholders. The results in this paper have important implications for bond rating 
agencies that, as the introductory quote suggests, are concerned but still debating how 
stronger governance affects bondholders. 
Our work is related to Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and Klock, Mansi and Maxwell 
(2003) in their focus on the relation between bondholder wealth and corporate 
governance. However, important differences exist, as these papers exclusively analyze 
how one single proxy for governance affect yields and/or ratings. Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003) use aggregate institutional ownership as their sole proxy for governance, and 
Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2003) use the GIM-index and look at yields only. In addition, 
this paper also uses a portfolio approach and a time series of bond prices to see how the 
effects of governance evolve into bond returns. Second, consistent with a simple model 
that we present, the relation between governance and bondholder wealth is not uniform 
across all firms as in Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2003). 
In fact, we show it is critical to consider how the effects of corporate governance depend 
on size and leverage, resulting in e.g. opposite effects among small and large firms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we use a simple 
model to articulate our hypotheses. After describing the data in section 3, we tests our 
hypotheses using data on bond yields and credit ratings in section 4. Section 5 
investigates how bond prices change over time. In section 6, we discuss the possible 
interpretations of our results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
II. A Simple Model and Hypothesis 
 
We use a simple framework to develop our hypothesis. Consider two firms, identical 
in all respects except in the degree of shareholder control. We consider two extreme cases 
of strong shareholder governance and weak shareholder governance. In the first case, 
shareholders monitor the CEO at a cost C while in the latter case the CEO is not 
monitored. For simplicity, we call the firm with strong shareholder control Watchdog Inc. 
and the firm with weak shareholder control Lapdog Inc. Both firms have a self-interested 
CEO and a single profitable project. The project has two possible payoffs – a high cash 
flow (H) or a low cash flow (L) with probability p and 1-p respectively.  If not monitored, 
the CEO expropriates amount, S (<L<H), from the cashflow of the firm in both possible 
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scenarios. Therefore, the manager is unable to steal in Watchdog Inc and that the 
manager steals S in Lapdog Inc. 
The time line is shown in Figure 1. The project is taken at time 0 with funds raised 
through the issuance of stock and bonds and the cashflows are realized at time 2. Assume 
that the firm issues bonds of face value F and funds the remaining investment through 
stocks. To focus on the interesting case I assume that  
 
A.1   L-S<F<L<H-S  
A.2   C < pS 
 
The first assumption ensures that bankruptcy occurs in the low state due to 
expropriation while the second assumption ensures that it is in the interests of shareholder 
to monitor the CEO. 
At time 1, a bidder appears with probability t. Assume that the bidder is honest and 
hence under the bidder’s management there is no theft.7 As argued earlier, bondholders 
face significant wealth changes during takeovers. Evidence on disciplinary takeovers 
suggests that bondholder wealth changes are negative (Warga and Welch, 1993).8 To 
capture this in reduced form, we simply assume that bondholders lose value W from a 
successful takeover. 9  Clearly, if W is negative, then bondholders will gain and our 
hypothesis will change accordingly.   
Let us now proceed to derive the bond prices for the firm with no shareholder control 
(Lapdog Inc.) and the firm with strong shareholder control (Watchdog Inc.). In the 
absence of any shareholder control, it is clear that the CEO will not be a willing target 
since he loses the opportunity to expropriate S. Therefore in the absence of any 
shareholder control, Lapdog Inc. will not be taken over at time 1 and the CEO will steal 
amount S at time 2, leaving the external claimholders H-S in the high state and L-S in the 
low state. The price of bond will then be  
 
P(Lapdog Inc.) = pF + (1-p)(L-S) = F – (1-p)(F-L+S) = F – (1-p)∆ 
 
                                                 
7
 This ensures that there is some value creation due to the takeover. 
8
 Even if the takeover mechanism is not a LBO, evidence suggests that the leverage of a firm goes up due 
to takeovers. As argued earlier, this is likely to hurt bondholders.  
9
 These could be losses due to an increase in leverage, or other sources such as an increased likelihood of 
asset sales, spinoffs etc. 
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where ∆ = F-L+S.10 
In the presence of a large monitoring shareholder, the bidder is more likely to 
succeed. The shareholders can tender their shares and save themselves the cost of 
monitoring C.11 Assuming that shareholders of Watchdog Inc. tender their shares in all 
cases of an offer, the probability of the firm being taken over at time 1 is then simply the 
probability of the bidder appearing which is t. 12  If the bidder does not appear, the 
shareholders continue monitoring the manager and prevent managerial theft. The price of 
the bond in this case is 
 
P(Watchdog ) = t (P(Watchdog )-W) + (1- t)( pF + (1-p)F) 
 
Note that the expected value of the bond in case of a takeover (the first term in the 
expression above) captures the loss of W.  Rearranging, the price of the bond is given by 
 
P(Watchdog ) = F – W t/(1- t) 
 
The condition for the P(Watchdog ) to be greater than P(Lapdog) is summarized by 
the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1:  In the presence of shareholder control, the price (yield) of the 
bond falls (rises) when  
W t/(1- t) > (1-p)∆ 
where ∆ = F-L+S. 
The condition above gives us our main hypothesis; that stronger shareholder control 
will be associated with higher (lower) bond yields when the firm is (not) vulnerable to 
takeovers.  
Since the probability of a takeover is a function of firm size, leverage (Stulz, 1988, 
Harris and Raviv, 1988, Zweibel, 1997, Novaes and Zingales, 1995) and the level of 
                                                 
10
 For simplicity, in the theoretical development of the hypothesis, we consider the case of risk neutral 
bondholders and a risk free rate of 0.  
11
 The value to the bidder is p(H-F). The value to the target shareholders is p(H-F) – C (>p(H-D-S)).  
Therefore there is a value creation opportunity of amount C that will be shared between the bidder and the 
target shareholders, based on their relative bargaining powers. 
12
 All that is required is that the probability of a takeover increase with greater shareholder control. 
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takeover defense provisions we rewrite the proposition above into the following 
hypotheses. 
 
H1. Stronger shareholder control will be associated with higher (lower) bond 
yields when takeover defenses are lower (higher). 
H2. Stronger shareholder control will be associated with higher (lower) bond 
yields when takeover defenses are lower (higher) and the firm is smaller (bigger). 
 
A lower leverage (lower F) not only increases the likelihood of a bidder appearing (t) 
but also affects ∆. A lower leverage reduces the left hand side and increases the right 
hand side of the condition above. Further, if bondholder wealth losses are because of an 
increase in leverage, such losses are more likely when the target firm has relatively low 
leverage. Thus the interaction of shareholder control and leverage is unambiguous and is 
stated in the hypothesis below.  
 
H3. Stronger shareholder control will be associated with higher (lower) bond 
yields when takeover defenses are lower (higher) and leverage is lower (higher).  
 
In the following, we test these three hypotheses using yields and also analyze how 
bond prices changes over time. We start with the description of our data. 
 
III.  Data 
 
The data used in this study can be separated into three categories – A) data on 
corporate bonds, B) data on governance mechanisms and C) data on firm characteristics.  
 
A. Corporate Bonds 
 
      We use two sources to collect the information required on corporate bonds. We use 
the Lehman Brothers’ Bond Database (LBBD) to construct yield spreads of bonds (used 
in section 4). The Lehman Brothers’ Bond Database (LBBD) reports the institutional 
pricing for Treasury and corporate bonds over the 1973 - 1997 time period. As our firm-
specific corporate governance proxies only start in 1990, we use only the latter part of the 
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database. Our sample includes an average of 1,839 corporate bonds per year from 1990 to 
1997. On average, there are 4.3 corporate bonds with the same issuing firms in our 
sample. LBBD contains both matrix prices as well as dealer quotes, where matrix prices 
are set according to some pricing algorithm based on bonds with similar characteristics. 
As matrix prices are regarded as less reliable than actual dealer quotes (see e.g. Warga 
and Welch (1993)), we only use dealer quotes. Finally, LBBD also provides information 
on some issue-level control variables such as issue size, number of years to maturity, 
dummies for callability, senior and senior-secured debt, and for 7 rating categories (for 
details, see the description of Table 3). 
The risk-free term structure of interest rates are from Salomon Brothers Yield Book, 
including the monthly treasury benchmark yields with time-to-maturity of 1 year, 2 years, 
3 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years and 30 years are retrieved.. The term structure of 
interest rate is used not only to compute yield spreads but also abnormal bond returns 
(used in section 5).  
We also use the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) to obtain information on 
bond covenants that protect bond investors. FISD contains detailed issue-level 
information on over 140,000 corporate, US Agency, US Treasury and supranational debt 
securities. Specifically, we focus on one critical covenant provision related to takeovers, 
namely the existence of a ‘poison put’. A poison put covenant gives bondholders the 
option of selling the issue back to the issuer at par or at a premium upon a change of 
control in the issuer. Poison puts are often used when a company fears an unwanted 
takeover (see Datta (1996) and Asquith and Wizman (1990)).  
 
B. Governance Mechanisms 
 
Our proxy for whether or not there is shareholder control is a dummy for the 
existence of an institutional blockholder, denoted by BLOCK = 1 if such an institutional 
blockholder is present. We define blockholders as shareholders with an ownership greater 
than 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares. To construct this measure, we use data on 
institutional share holdings from Thompson / CDA Spectrum, which collects quarterly 
information from the SEC 13f filings.13,14 By using institutional blockholding rather than 
                                                 
13
 The 1978 amendment to the Security and Exchange Act of 1934 requires all institutional investors with 
more than $100 million under management to report their shareholdings to the SEC. 
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simply institutional ownership, we mitigate the problem that institutions with minor 
stakes have few incentives to be involved in firm-specific decisions. Furthermore, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that blockholders often have substantial voting control, 
enabling them to pressurize the firm’s management.  
We use data on anti-takeover provisions in the firm’s charter from Investor Research 
Responsibility Center (IRRC) publications to construct an anti-takeover index (ATI) that 
proxies an individual firm’s exposure to the market of corporate control. We also confirm 
our results using the index developed, from the same source, by Gompers, Ishi and 
Metrick (2003). The IRRC data used to construct these indices are available during our 
time period for the years 1990, 1993 and 1995. While IRRC does not update all 
companies in a new edition, Gompers, Ishi and Metrick (2003) argue that there is no 
reason to suspect systematic biases in this data.  
ATI (for a detailed description, see Cremers and Nair (2003)) uses information on 
three anti-takeover provisions that the literature has recognized to be the critical for 
takeovers – preferred blank check, staggered boards and restrictions on calling special 
meetings and action through written consent. The existence of the preferred blank check 
not only implicitly equips the firm with a poison pill, but also enables the management to 
issue new classes of stock without shareholder approval and significantly reduces 
takeover probability (see e.g. Ambrose and Megginson (1992)). Further, classified boards 
as well as restrictions on calling specials meetings and action through written consent 
create significant delays in takeover battles (see e.g. Benchuk, Coates, and Subramanian 
(2002) and Daines and Klausner (2001)).15  Therefore, these provisions create barriers to 
takeovers in addition to the poison pill (blank check). In fact, some legal scholars deem 
classified boards the single most important factor in takeover defense due to the long 
delay it causes.16   
These three provisions produce a takeover vulnerability index varying from 0 to 3, 
adding one point if a provision is not in place. We classify firms with ATI = 0 as having 
lowest takeover vulnerability, and those with ATI = 3 as being most prone to takeovers. 
                                                                                                                                                 
14
 Non-institutional blockholders are omitted in the study, due to the difficulty of collecting reliable data for 
such a large sample over this time period. We will discuss to extent to which this omission may affect our 
results. 
15
 Daines and Klausner (2002) show that restrictions on calling special meetings coupled with restrictions 
on acting through written consent can delay the acquiror by 12 to 18 months, depending on state laws. 
16
 Bebchuk et al. (2002) find that an effective staggered board doubled the odds of remaining independent 
for an average target. A classified board can impose a delay of up to 2 years. 
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In any year, about 31% of firms have ATI = 0, 32% have ATI = 1, 32% have ATI = 2, 
and finally about 5% of firms have ATI = 3.  
The index based on Gompers, Ishi and Metrick (2003) is termed EXT. The index 
EXT incorporates 24 different provisions in 5 categories – tactics for delaying hostile 
bidders, voting rights, director/officer protection, other takeover defenses and state laws – 
all of which directly affect takeover protection.17 The index EXT is formed by adding one 
point if the firm does not have a specific defensive provision in place and zero otherwise, 
leading to values between 0 and 24. As a result, a larger value of EXT signifies fewer 
protections against the market for corporate control, and thus greater exposure to 
takeovers.18 
 
C. Firm Characteristics 
 
 Firm characteristics such as leverage and market capitalization, are obtained from 
the Compustat / CRSP database. Firm accounting data are from the Compustat Quarterly 
database. All variables are lagged by 3 months to ensure that the accounting information 
is public when rating/yield analysis is conducted. Leverage is defined as (Total long-term 
debt + Debt in current liabilities)/Total liabilities.  
 
IV. Shareholder Control, Bond Spreads and Ratings 
 
In this section, we document the impact of shareholder control on corporate bond 
spreads, and test the hypotheses stated in section 2. The bond spreads are bond yields 
adjusted for the risk-free term structure of interest rates. For each issue, we match by 
time-to-maturity to get the corresponding Treasury benchmark yield. Monthly treasury 
benchmark yields with time-to-maturity of 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 
years and 30 years are retrieved from Salomon Brothers Yield Book. We use linear 
interpolation to calculate treasury yields with time-to-maturity of other years below 30. 
For the few observations with time-to-maturity above 30 years, we use the 30-year 
treasury benchmark. For each observation, the spread is calculated as the difference 
between the bond yield and its corresponding treasury benchmark. 
                                                 
17
 For a more detailed description of the 24 provisions, see Gompers, Ishi and Metrick (2003). 
18
 Therefore, our external governance index is a linear transformation of the index as used in Gompers, Ishi 
and Metrick (2003), which is denoted by G, such that EXT = 24 – G. 
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We start by presenting some summary statistics of our data. Table 1 reports the 
average number of bonds per year and per firm, the quartile percentages of the 
shareholdings of the largest blockholder and of the shareholders rights index EXT as well 
as the number of firms in the four ATI groups are given. Our sample consists of an 
average of 1839 bonds from 426 firms per year, or 4.3 bonds per firm.19 The takeover 
vulnerability indices ATI and EXT are fairly stable over time for most firms. About a 
quarter of firms have EXT ≤ 12 and a quarter of firms have EXT ≥ 16. The distribution of 
ATI is more lopsided, with about 32% of the firms having no takeover protection       
(ATI = 0) and 5% of the firms protected completely (ATI = 3). Around 63% of firms 
have a blockholder at any one time and consistent with the evidence on increasing 
institutional ownership in the 90s (Gompers and Metrick, 1999), blockholder ownership 
appears to have increased over this time period. 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of EXT, BLOCK, SIZE, LEVERAGE and 
RATING. Most correlations are relatively small, the exceptions being that RATING has a 
56% correlation with SIZE and a -26% correlation with the industry-adjusted 
LEVERAGE, where RATING is defined such that a higher value implies a lower 
probability of bankruptcy. Also, EXT and BLOCK have a low, negative correlation of 
6%, and are uncorrelated with SIZE.  
In table 3 (4), we report the results from the panel regression of corporate bond 
spreads on the various governance-related variables plus the firm-specific control 
variables using ATI (EXT) as the proxy for exposure to takeovers. We report the basic 
results in panel A, and those that include fixed issuer effects in panel B.20 We discuss the 
results without fixed issuer effects first.  
 
A.1. The Impact of BLOCK on Bond Spreads (using ATI) 
 
Before we begin to test our hypotheses, we look at the effect of shareholder control 
(BLOCK) and exposure to takeovers (ATI and ATI*BLOCK) independently in the first 
three models. The interaction term, ATI*BLOCK, is intended to capture ‘effective’ 
takeover vulnerability since the presence of a blockholder might be necessary to facilitate 
                                                 
19
 That means that the reported t-statistics need to be interpreted with some caution. In case of perfect 
correlation across different issues per firm, for all firms, the t-statistics would need to be divided by the 
square root of 4.3, i.e. 2.07. However, even if this extreme case basically all our main results hold. 
20
 Fixed issuer effects are incorporated using dummies for each issuer (the coefficients are not reported). 
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takeovers even if the firm does not have takeover protection.21 Thus, a blockholder in 
addition to low takeover defenses is essential to make a firm truly vulnerable to takeovers. 
Each of the first three models has one variable; namely BLOCK, ATI and 
ATI*BLOCK, in addition to the set of controls. First, we find that shareholder control by 
itself, as proxied by BLOCK, is not significantly related to bond spreads. A possible 
reason for this, which we confirm below, is that BLOCK has opposite effects depending 
on whether the firm is prone to takeovers or not. This view is further strengthened by 
observing that both ATI and ATI*BLOCK by themselves have positive and significant 
coefficients, indicating that increased exposure to the market for corporate control 
increases bond spreads.   
We test our main hypothesis H1 in model 4 where we consider all three variables 
(ATI, BLOCK and ATI*BLOCK) simultaneously in addition to the set of controls. As 
per our hypothesis, we would expect yields to reduce with BLOCK but increase with 
BLOCK*ATI.  Indeed and consistent with our hypothesis, BLOCK now has a strongly 
negative and significant coefficient, equal to –0.24 with a t-stat of –7.2, and 
ATI*BLOCK has a strongly positive and significant coefficient, equal to 0.12 with a t-
stat of 8.3. The coefficient of ATI is insignificant. This corroborates the complementary 
relationship of firms’ takeover provisions and the existence of active shareholders 
established in Cremers and Nair (2003) and suggests that exposure to takeovers is a 
concern to bondholders only in the presence on large shareholders.  
Therefore, BLOCK appears to be associated with two opposite effects. First, the 
existence of an active shareholder can facilitate the transfer of control for firms whose 
provisions do not preclude takeovers. This makes such firms more vulnerable for 
leverage-increasing takeovers, hence bond issued by these firms demand higher yields. 
Second, higher shareholder vigilance, in this case by large institutional shareholders, 
could reduce the chance of bankruptcy and decrease yields. This confirms our hypothesis 
H1. Also, note that the observed effects are economically important. A firm with both 
active shareholders (i.e. BLOCK equal to one) and few anti-takeover provisions         
(ATI = 3) is associated with a yield spread of 12 basis points higher  (-24 + 3 x 12) than 
firms without a blockholder. A firm with a blockholder but takeover protection (ATI = 0) 
is associated with a yield spread of 24 basis points lower than a firm without a 
                                                 
21
 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that even if a firm is exposed to the market for corporate control, 
disciplinary takeovers are unlikely to occur if the shareholders are dispersed. 
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blockholder. Thus, contingent on the exposure to takeovers, blockholders are associated 
with contrasting effects on yield spreads, with the difference between ATI = 3 and       
ATI = 0 being 36 basis points  (24 - (-12) bp). 
Next, we proceed to consider hypotheses H2 and H3 by investigating the impact of 
size and leverage due to their impact on takeover vulnerability. ‘Effective’ takeover 
vulnerability now includes the presence of a blockholder, low takeover defense, a lower 
size and lower leverage. We sort all firms independently into 3 different groups according 
to both size (small-medium-large) and leverage (low-medium-high), and create dummies 
for small and large size as well as low and high leverage. The dummy coefficients should 
be interpreted relative to the associated medium categories. Here, size is measured as the 
market capitalization of the outstanding equity, and for leverage we use industry-median-
adjusted leverage. The 48 Fama-French (1997) industry classifications are used for 
industry-adjustments through out the paper. 
In model 5, we add the interaction of ATI*BLOCK with the small and large size 
dummies to the variables in model 4. The results strongly confirm our hypothesis 2 (H2), 
that stronger shareholder control increases yields for small firms, as the coefficient for 
ATI*BLOCK of small firms is a highly significant 0.23 whereas the coefficient for large 
firms is negative but insignificant (-0.01), which constitutes a clearly statistically 
significant difference. Therefore, a firm with a blockholder and exposure to takeovers 
(ATI = 3) is associated a yield spread of 36 basis points higher than a firm with 
blockholders and protection from takeovers (ATI = 0) if the firm is small. 
We now proceed to investigate the effect of leverage. We find that conditioning on 
leverage alone leads to no differences in the effect of shareholder control. Specifically, 
when we add low and high leverage dummies to the interaction of ATI*BLOCK (model 
6), we observe no differences. However, when we interact the complementary measure of 
takeover vulnerability, ATI*BLOCK, with both the small and large size dummies as well 
as the low and high leverage dummies simultaneously (model 7), the evidence is 
supportive of H3. For the large firms, the coefficients on ATI*BLOCK is similar (and not 
statistically different) for high and low leverage firms. However, for the small firms, the 
coefficient on ATI*BLOCK is lower for firms with higher leverage (a difference of 3 
basis points), and that difference is (marginally) significant. The evidence supports 
hypothesis 3 (H3), that shareholder control is associated with higher yields for firms that 
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have lower leverage. However, the hypothesis is supported only for those firms that are 
small. 
 
A.2. With Fixed Issuer Effects 
 
The corresponding results using ATI that include fixed issuer effects, as found in 
panel B of table 3, confirm the main results above. An encouraging sign is that the impact 
of size and leverage with respect to the coefficient of ATI*BLOCK are stronger with 
fixed issuer effects. Specifically, the (cumulative) coefficient on ATI*BLOCK is -0.05 
for large firms with high leverage, 0.07 for large firms with low leverage, 0.17 for small 
firms with high leverage, 0.31 for small firms with low leverage, compared to an average 
coefficient of 0.12. Most importantly, all coefficients and all differences between 
coefficients are statistically significant, confirming all our hypotheses. The appearance of 
a blockholder is now associated with an increase of 78 (= 93 - 15) basis points if the firm 
is exposed to takeovers (ATI = 3), has low leverage and is small in size and a zero 
cumulative effect (= 5 x 3 - 15) firm is large and has high leverage. On the other hand, 
the appearance of a blockholder is associated with a decrease of 15 basis points if the 
firm is not exposed to takeovers (ATI = 0). 
 
A.3 Using EXT as a Proxy For Takeover Protection 
 
A final robustness check is done using EXT rather than ATI as the measure of the 
number of provisions related to takeovers. The results without fixed issuer effects are 
presented in Table 4.22  The results are statistically similar to those using ATI.  
In order to compare the economic significance of both sets of results, we can 
multiply all coefficients for EXT by 3, which is the ratio of the respective standard 
deviations of EXT and ATI (which are equal to 2.71 and 0.90, respectively). That way, 
the re-scaled coefficient of EXT*BLOCK in model 4 equals 0.07, which is only about 
half the impact of ATI, which has a corresponding coefficient of 0.12. As a further 
example we take the difference in the re-scaled coefficients of EXT*BLOCK with 
respect to size, which produces a 5 basis point difference in for small relative to large 
firms. In contrast, there is a 12 basis point greater impact for an increase in ATI for small 
                                                 
22
  The coefficients on the control variables are omitted in the interest of exposition and are similar to the 
ones reported in Table 3. 
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as compared to large firms. Finally, the results using EXT with fixed issuer effects are 
similar to those without fixed effects and are not presented in the interests of space. 
It is useful to discuss the results in Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2003) in order to 
highlight the contrasting effects of shareholder control. Klock et. al. focus on the direct 
relationship between bond yields and the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index 
(EXT). In effect, their paper exclusively investigates model 2 in Table 4 in our paper, and 
does not account for the interaction of EXT with the presence of active shareholders 
(BLOCK) nor explores the effects of size and leverage on this interaction. As regression 
models 4 - 7 indicate, the interaction between shareholder control and takeover protection 
is important and varies across firms.  
Our results confirm the complementary relationship between active shareholders and 
direct exposure to the market of corporate control, as documented in Cremers and Nair 
(2003) for equity prices. Specifically, the coefficient of EXT in model 4 is –0.004 with a 
t-stat of –1.03, while the coefficient of EXT*BLOCK is 0.023 with a t-stat of 4.71. 
Therefore, the increase of bond spreads associated with fewer anti-takeover provisions is 
only existent for firms where there is an active shareholder as well. Furthermore, 
accounting for BLOCK also greatly increases the economic impact of a one-point 
increase in EXT, comparing a coefficient of EXT in model 2 equal to 0.009 to a 
coefficient of EXT*BLOCK in model 4 equal to 0.023. 
 
B. Shareholder control and ratings 
 
In this section, we digress briefly to see the marginal effects of shareholder control 
and takeover vulnerability on the likelihood that a firm falls in a particular S&P rating 
category. The main motive for doing so is to see whether the rating agencies implicitly or 
explicitly capture these governance relations. If they do, our results would be 
economically stronger since we already control for ratings. If the rating agencies capture 
these governance mechanisms in a direction opposite to what the yield spread results then 
our results might be weaker as the net economic importance might now be lower.  
An ordered probit model is used to relate the different rating categories to the 
governance and control variables (see Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998) and Bhojraj 
and Sengupta (2003) for other papers using an ordered probit for this purpose). Following 
Fama and French (2001), we first estimate the probit regressions across firms for each 
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quarter separately and then, in the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973), report the time 
series averages of the coefficients. This allows for correlation of the regression residuals 
across firms. We define a seven-way classification representing S&P ratings (closest to) 
AAA, AA, BBB, BB, B, CCC, and lower, respectively. The model is set up such that it is 
modeling the probability of the highest rating level. Finally, the models are exactly 
analogous to those used for the bond-spread regressions in the previous section to 
facilitate a direct comparison.  
 
Basic results using ATI 
 
First, the marginal effects of BLOCK, ATI and ATI*BLOCK individually are 
considered in the first three models, and all three are combined in model 4. We find that 
the existence of an institutional blockholder, as a proxy for an active shareholder, 
strongly decreases ratings by itself. This is evidenced by a coefficient of BLOCK equal to 
–0.48 (t-stat of –18.4) in model 1, confirming one of the main results in Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003). However, we will later see that the negative impact on ratings is mostly 
due to the interaction of BLOCK with ATI, and not of BLOCK by itself.  
Most interesting, ATI by itself in model 2 has a positive and significant coefficient 
of 0.10 (t-stat of 10.1). This separate effect of ATI is clearly stronger and much more 
robust than the corresponding effect in the spread regressions, where the effect of ATI by 
itself is only very marginally significant for fixed issuer effects and disappears when 
ATI*BLOCK is included as well. This is the first paper documenting the effect of 
takeover vulnerability on ratings, and our results suggests that the rating agencies indeed 
take takeover protection provisions into account.   
Interestingly, we also find that ratings react to the interaction of BLOCK and ATI in 
the same direction as yield spreads do. ATI*BLOCK by itself in model 3 has a negative 
and significant coefficient of –0.15 (t-stat of –12.9). Combining BLOCK, ATI and 
ATI*BLOCK all three in model 4 increases the economic significance of ATI 
(coefficient of 0.20 with t-stat of 11.0) as well as the complementary interaction of ATI 
with BLOCK (coefficient of –0.18 with t-stat of –6.9).  Thus, the net effect of a high 
takeover vulnerability and high shareholder control is higher than what the yield-spread 
regressions suggest. 
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In contrast with the spread regressions where BLOCK was found to have opposite 
effects depending on whether a firm is prone to takeovers or not, 23  here BLOCK’s 
coefficient is consistently negative though hardly significant.24 Next, the effect of size on 
the impact of takeover vulnerability as measured by ATI*BLOCK appears to be 
particularly significant for ratings. In model 5, a greater takeover vulnerability even has 
increases the rating for the largest third of firms, as evidenced by an overall positive 
marginal effect. In sharp contrast, the marginal effect for the smallest third of firms is 
strongly negative or decreasing ratings. 
 In order to interpret the economic significance of the coefficients of ATI*BLOCK 
for bond of firms of different sizes, we calculate the marginal effect of an increase of 
those coefficients from their median coefficient by one unit. For bonds with an average 
rating of A-, the model probability of being in that rating category decreases by 21.6% 
for small firms, increases by 0.6% for large firms, and decreases by 5.9% on average. 
Relative to the size effect, the role of leverage is limited. Leverage by itself has no 
discernable impact on the coefficient of ATI*BLOCK (see model 6), and only a small 
effect once combined with size in model 7. There is some evidence that the negative 
marginal effect of ATI*BLOCK is strongest for not just small firms, but more 
specifically small firms with higher leverage than average. However, this difference is 
not economically significant. Specifically, for averaged rated bonds, a unit increase in the 
coefficient of ATI*BLOCK decreases the probability of being in the average rating 
category decreases by 21.8% for small firms with high leverage and by 18.4% for small 
firms with low leverage. Furthermore, this effect does not appear to be particularly robust, 
as there is hardly any difference between ATI*BLOCK’s coefficient for low and high 
levered small firms when using EXT. The results using EXT are similar to the results 
using ATI and are presented in Table 6. 
These results show that the rating agencies view shareholder control beneficial for 
firms that are large and protected from takeovers and harmful for firms that are exposed 
to takeovers and are small. Even after controlling for this effect of shareholder control on 
ratings, yield spreads further reflect the effects of shareholder control – perhaps due to 
the delayed updating of ratings. For the variables that rarely change over time, e.g., 
                                                 
23
 However, this result became marginally significant for ATI and disappeared for EXT for fixed issuer-
effects. 
24
 Note that the t-stats have to be divided by approximately 2 to control for the average number of 4.3 bond 
issues per firm. 
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ATI/EXT, the ratings capture all the effect leaving no residual effects for the yield 
spreads, lending support to the view that delayed updating might be important.  
 
V. Bond Returns 
 
We have shown that bondholders demand a significantly higher yield for bonds of 
firms that have both a large shareholder and low takeover defense. In this section, we 
investigate the extent to which realized bond returns reflect these expectations by 
comparing the returns of a portfolio of firms that have both a large shareholder and high 
takeover vulnerability to a portfolio of firms with neither a large blockholder nor a high 
vulnerability to takeovers.  
To account for systematic differences in the portfolios, we use a we use the Elton, 
Gruber and Blake (1995) four-factor model: including an equity market factor (S&P 500 
excess returns), a corporate bond market factor (Salomon Brothers (SB) corporate bond 
index excess returns), a default risk factor (the difference between returns from the SB 
High Yield bond market index and the SB Treasury market index), and finally a factor 
capturing option features (the difference between returns from the SB Medium Term 
Mortgage index and the SB Medium Term Treasury index).   
This bond-pricing model does not generate any significant abnormal returns for a 
portfolio that uses all the bonds in our sample. However, this bond-pricing model, and 
others in the literature, ignores shareholder control variables. Therefore, if the 
expectations inherent in the yields are correct, bonds of firms with high shareholder 
control and high takeover vulnerability would generate an abnormal return relative to this 
bond-pricing model by increasing credit risk. The spread and rating results suggests that 
BLOCK and ATI are complements in being associated with higher yields, particularly for 
firms that are small and have a low industry-adjusted leverage, reflecting higher takeover 
vulnerability. As a result, for bonds with both a high BLOCK and high ATI, we would 
expect positive abnormal bond returns for the current bond-pricing models. In doing so, 
we also show how abnormal bond returns resulting from a standard bond-pricing model 
are related to our proxies of shareholder control.  
Our sample consists of 75 monthly returns from 1991:1 to 1997:3. The estimated 
abnormal returns are the constants or alphas in the regressions of excess returns of 
various bond portfolios on these four factors. 
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5.A. Portfolios sorted on BLOCK and ATI/EXT 
 
At the beginning of each quarter, we independently sort all firms on BLOCK and on 
either ATI or EXT. Using BLOCK, we form two groups (with and without an 
institutional blockholder) while using ATI and EXT, we form three groups - ATI = 0, 
ATI = 1, ATI >1 and EXT < 12, 11 < EXT < 16, EXT > 15. The cutoffs for both ATI and 
EXT were chosen to get the most even distribution of firms over three portfolios.25  Thus, 
we create 2 x 3  = 6 portfolios by a two-way sort on ATI (or EXT) and BLOCK. For all 
portfolios, we compute both the equally-weighted and the value-weighted (using the 
market value of each bond issue) excess return of all firms’ bond issues. 
In Table 7, we report the annualized abnormal returns or alphas of several long-short 
portfolios. First, we estimate the alphas accruing to four portfolios that each buy bonds of 
firms with a blockholder and sell bonds of firms without a blockholder - one portfolio 
considers all firms unconditionally and the other three portfolios consider firms 
conditional on one of the three levels of takeover vulnerability (using ATI or EXT 
groups). Second, we estimate the alphas accruing to three portfolios that each buy bonds 
of firms in the highest ATI or EXT category and sell bonds of firms in the lowest ATI or 
EXT category: again one portfolio considers all firms unconditionally and the other two 
portfolios consider firms conditional on one of the two groups of shareholder control 
(using BLOCK). The results are presented in Panel A for ATI and Panel B for EXT. 
The long-short portfolio that holds firms with and shorts firms without a blockholder 
produces a clearly statistically significant annualized abnormal return of 1.25% for the 
equally-weighted portfolio (t-stat of 3.44) and of 0.67% for the value-weighted portfolio 
(t-stat of 2.74). Interestingly, the long-short portfolios conditional on ATI/EXT show that 
these abnormal returns are driven by bonds of firms vulnerable to takeovers, providing 
strong evidence for a complementary relation of BLOCK with ATI/EXT. For the equally-
weighted portfolios, the mean returns and the alphas are increasing in the level of both 
ATI and EXT. For example, the annualized alpha of the long-short portfolio that buys 
bonds of firms with a blockholder and shorts those without a blockholder equals 0.77% 
(t-stat of 1.67) for firms with the lowest level of EXT and equals 1.63% (t-stat of 2.94) 
for firms with the highest level of EXT. As a result, the equally-weighted portfolios 
                                                 
25
 See Table 1 for the distribution of firms over both ATI and EXT categories.  
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suggest that blockholding seems only associated with higher abnormal bond returns for 
firms in the highest ATI or EXT categories.  
For ATI, the value-weighted portfolios are fully consistent with the equally-weighted 
portfolios. However, the value-weighted portfolios using EXT show no pattern in either 
mean bond returns or alphas. The difference between equal and value-weighted results is 
suggestive of a size effect, similar to that found for yields and ratings. Before we 
investigate the role of size in more detail, we consider the importance of ATI and EXT by 
looking at the returns to a portfolio that buys bonds of firms in the highest ATI or EXT 
category and shorts those in the lowest category. 
The results for using ATI and EXT are presented in Panel C and D, respectively, of 
Table 7. We find no evidence for any abnormal returns for ATI at all. For EXT, the 
equally-weighted portfolios show an abnormal return, but only for those firms where 
there is also a blockholder present, again confirming complementarity. For example, the 
annualized alpha of such long-short portfolio for firms without a blockholder is 0.27% (t-
stat of 0.57), and of the portfolio with only firms with a blockholder is 1.13% (t-stat of 
2.32). However, there is no discernible pattern using value-weighted portfolios and EXT, 
which is, once more, suggestive of a size effect. 
 
5.B Abnormal returns and the role of firm size and leverage 
 
We have seen in section 4 that the increase in yield spreads on the appearance of a 
blockholder is the highest for firms that are small. Consistent with this, we also find in 
the previous subsection that the abnormal returns are strongest for the equally weighted 
portfolios. We now directly investigate the role of firm size in generating abnormal 
returns associated with shareholder control and takeover vulnerability. As the yield 
results also suggest different bondholder reactions with changing leverage, we investigate 
if the abnormal returns vary by leverage as well. To investigate how the documented 
effects of takeover vulnerability and active shareholders on bond abnormal returns are 
affected by firm-level characteristics such as leverage and firm size, we use the 2-step 
weighted least squares methodology developed in Cremers and Nair (2003).  We briefly 
describe the procedure below. 
The weighted least squares methodology proposed in Cremers and Nair (2003) could 
be used as an alternative to a panel data approach for the general case of investigating the 
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relationship between alphas and firm characteristics and consists of two steps. The first 
step consists of the estimation of the portfolio alphas using the four-factor bond-pricing 
model described above, as well as the variance-covariance matrix of these alphas.  We 
form 54 portfolios by sorting all firms independently in four dimensions: ATI (EXT), 
BLOCK, industry-adjusted leverage (LEV) and the market value of equity (SIZE). We 
get 54 portfolios by sorting firms into 3 leverage categories and 3 size categories in 
addition to the pre-existing three categories of ATI (EXT) and two categories of BLOCK 
(3 x 2 x 3 x 3 = 54). For each of the 54 groups, we calculate the abnormal returns of the 
equally-weighted portfolio of all bonds issued by the firms in the group.26  
In the second step, these alphas are regressed on characteristics using the variance-
covariance matrix of the alphas as the weighting matrix. Due to the noise in estimating 
the alphas of individual bond issues, the sorting of bonds into portfolios along all relevant 
dimensions greatly increases the methodology’s power by reducing idiosyncratic risk. 
Further, the methodology explicitly accounts for the estimation risk and covariance of the 
alphas by weighting the alphas by their variance-covariance matrix in the second-step 
regression. Another important advantage of this method is that it uses the information 
contained in all 54 alphas, rather than only focusing on the extreme portfolios along a 
particular dimension. That way, we are still able to detect significant relationships 
between these alphas, even though the additional sorts on LEV and SIZE reduce the 
number of bonds in each portfolio. Finally, the quarterly sorts should reduce the noise in 
each proxy and also override the concern of standard panel methods that typically 
estimate bond (or firm) alphas that are constant over time.  
Before we proceed to investigate the effect of firm size and leverage on how 
shareholder control is associated with bond returns, we first check – abstracting from 
issues of corporate governance - if the bond pricing model employed generates any 
abnormal returns along portfolios based on size and leverage. If the pricing model 
employed here generates abnormal returns for a sample of firms based on size and 
leverage, it is then important that these characteristics are first directly controlled before 
we look at the effect of size and leverage in the interaction of bond returns and 
governance mechanisms. To this end, in Table 8 we first present the results of regressing 
alphas on the size and leverage dummies only, without using any governance variables at 
                                                 
26
 On average, less than 1.5% of the portfolios are empty. Further, we also compute value-weighted 
portfolios, whose results are generally similar to the equally-weighted portfolios, though occasionally with 
reduced significance. Results are omitted to save space but are available upon request. 
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all.27 These results indeed point toward a systematic role of size and leverage with respect 
to these alphas. The mispricing of the bonds of small, highly leveraged firms is most 
severe, with a coefficient of 2.34 (t-stat of 2.3) using ATI and a coefficient of 5.18 (t-stat 
of 6.9) using EXT. The alphas for these categories of firms, highlighted in table 8, are 
statistically different from the average alphas. We correct for this mispricing by adding 
the relevant size-leverage dummies separately to the regressions.28  
 
ATI/EXT, BLOCK and SIZE 
 
We separately investigate the role of SIZE in how ATI, EXT and BLOCK affect the 
bond portfolio alphas, by running the second-step regression of alphas on the level of 
either ATI, EXT or BLOCK using three size dummies.29 The results using ATI and EXT 
can be found in Panel B of Table 8. The regressions indicate it is critical to incorporate 
size. Specifically, we find that fewer anti-takeover provisions, measured by ATI or EXT, 
as well as the existence of a blockholder are all associated with higher abnormal bond 
returns. However, this relation is clearly strongest for the group of smallest firms, is 
generally still apparent for the group of firms of medium size, and is absent for the group 
of largest firms. For example, the coefficient of ATI equals 0.77 (t-stat of 2.98) for the 
smallest firms, equals 0.16 (t-stat of 2.1) for the medium size firm, and equals 0.04 (t-stat 
of 0.56) for the largest firms. Also, the existence of a blockholder generally increases 
bond alphas especially for the smallest third of firms (by 1.35) in our sample.  
Next, we consider the interaction of the existence of active shareholders with the 
takeover provisions and incorporate both size and leverage. To detect the dependence of 
these two corporate governance mechanisms, we employ the Min() function, and to 
detect independence we use the Max() function. Here, min and max denote the minimum 
and maximum, respectively, among each of the 54 portfolios of their levels of BLOCK 
and ATI/EXT. These functional forms capture in a simple manner the main difference 
between the two possibilities. 30  First, if the two mechanisms were dependent or 
complements with respect to the bond abnormal returns, an increase in the level of either 
                                                 
27
 Here, no intercept can be included in the regressions, in contrast to all regressions using corporate 
governance variables, where an intercept is included in the regressions but is not reported in the tables. 
28
 Various combinations of size and leverage controls produce similar results.  
29
 There are two regressions for BLOCK, both for the ATI x BLOCK x SIZE x LEV and the EXT x 
BLOCK x SIZE x LEV sorted sets of 54 portfolios.  
30
 Cremers and Nair (2003) use similar functional forms. The results using ATI/EXT and BLOCK instead 
of the Min-function are similar and available upon request. 
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mechanism keeping the other fixed, would not change alphas. In that case, the Max-
coefficient would be insignificant, and the Min-coefficient would be positive and 
significant.  We find that the coefficient on the Max function is insignificant while the 
coefficient on the Min form is significant – confirming our earlier results that ATI and 
BLOCK are complements in generating abnormal returns. In what follows we present 
regressions only using the Min function. 
 
ATI/EXT, BLOCK, SIZE and LEVERAGE 
 
The results for the interaction of the shareholder control and exposure to takeovers 
contingent on firm size and leverage is presented in Table 9. We find that BLOCK and 
ATI/EXT are strong complements in being associated with higher bond alphas mostly for 
small firms with some evidence that the complementary relation is stronger in small firms 
with low leverage. 
Considering the impact of size in isolation on the interaction between takeover 
vulnerability and shareholder control, we find no evidence of a complementary relation 
between these two governance mechanisms for large firms.31 Specifically, using ATI the 
coefficient on the Min-function for small firms equals 1.19 (t-stat of 2.6). If we use EXT, 
the coefficient on the Min-function is equal to 2.33 (t-stat of 3.5) for small firms. For 
large firms both these coefficients are insignificant. The minor economic significance for 
the larger firms is no surprise, given our previous finding that the impact of the corporate 
governance mechanisms is strongest for the smallest third of firms (as documented in 
Table 8). Overall, this confirms our findings of the yield spread regressions and the 
ratings analysis in the previous section. Furthermore, these results can also reconcile the 
differences between the value- and equally-weighted portfolios in Table 7 as the largest 
firms dominate the returns of the value-weighted portfolios.  
When considering leverage along with size, we find that the coefficient on the Min 
function (1.33 with a t-stat of 4) is significant only for firms that are small and have low 
leverage. These results using ATI show that a portfolio that buys bonds of firms with 
both low takeover protection and high shareholder control and sells bonds of firms 
without either governance mechanism generates abnormal returns only when the firm is 
small and has low leverage.  While this is consistent with our earlier results and our 
                                                 
31
 Results presented in Table 9 consider both size and leverage. 
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hypothesis, the results using EXT are mixed. Specifically, the Min-coefficient for small, 
low leveraged firms equals 1.38 (t-stat of 3.9) and for small, high leveraged firms equals 
3.20 (t-stat of 2.64). However, the t-statistic of the null hypothesis of both these 
coefficient being equal is 1.5, such that this difference is not statistically significant. 
In conclusion, the realized bond returns are consistent with the expectations inherent 
in the yield results and suggest that bondholders require a higher rate of return in the 
presence of shareholder control when the firm has low takeover defense, is small in size 
and has low leverage. 
 
6. Interpretation and Implications 
 
A.  Are the losses related to takeovers? 
  
We document strong and contrasting bondholder reactions to shareholder control 
conditional on takeover vulnerability. Bondholder require a higher yield for exposure to 
shareholder control especially when leverage is low – this is the opposite of what one 
would expect if risk-shifting were the primary source of conflict. To further mitigate the 
concern that takeover protection might be proxying for some unrelated source of 
bondholder loss, we now consider only those bonds that have a poison-put covenant.  A 
poison put covenant gives bondholders the option of selling the issue back to the issuer at 
par or at a premium upon a change of control in the issuer. Poison puts are often used 
when a company fears an unwanted takeover by protecting bondholders for the 
eventuality of a successful hostile takeover triggering an event that substantially reduces 
the value of the bonds (see Datta (1996) and Asquith and Wizman (1990)).  
Table 10 documents the results of the fixed effects yield spread regressions for this 
sample when ATI is used as an index of takeover vulnerability. Results using EXT are 
similar and are not reported.  The number of firms for which we have information on the 
covenants is 561 with an average of 4.18 issues per firm. The number of firms with the 
poison put covenant is137 with an average of 1.73 issues per firm. The results show that 
the coefficients on BLOCK and on the interaction between ATI and BLOCK are not 
significant for the sample with the poison put covenant. Since we have 2,393 
observations in total, this result is unlikely due to a small sample. Further, the direction of 
impact also appears to be considerably lower and in some cases, the opposite of what we 
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have in the full sample (see model 7 in table 9). We also find that the conflict is now 
higher for firms with higher leverage – we find that the appearance of a blockholder 
increases yield spreads of small firms with low takeover protection only if they have high 
leverage. This is more supportive of risk shifting as the source of bondholder loss.  
Therefore, the result shown in the previous sections are stronger for those bonds that are 
not protected by the poison put covenant. This further strengthens our evidence that it is 
indeed the losses during hostile takeovers that the bondholders price. 
 
B.   Hostile Takeovers and Leverage 
 
What is it about hostile takeovers that bondholders fear? As discussed earlier, one 
possible channel of bondholder loss is an increase in leverage. In the 80’s, due to the 
predominance of LBOs, this is was an obvious concern (see e.g., Warga and Welch, 
1993). However, this is less obvious in the 1990’s and so we document how leverage 
changes for hostile targets in the more recent period. 
Using SDC and excluding open market purchases, we detect 80 hostile takeovers in 
our sample. To classify the bid as hostile, we use the same algorithm used by Lehn and 
Mitchell (1989). Out of these, we consider the 26 completed hostile takeovers only, as we 
are interested in leverage changes after the takeover. Further, we are able to detect the 
acquirer and get quarterly leverage data for only 16 of these completed deals. Although 
our sample is small, we find that for each one of these 16 cases, the leverage increases 
after the takeover. The graph for average leverage around the takeover announcement 
quarter is shown in Figure 2. The average increase is significant and the expectation of 
higher leverage post takeovers could drive ex-ante bondholders expectations. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
We investigate the effect of shareholder control on bondholder wealth and document 
that shareholder control can have contrasting effects on bond yields, ratings and returns, 
depending on the takeover vulnerability of a firm. Using the presence of an institutional 
blockholder to proxy for shareholder control and firm-level anti-takeover provisions to 
proxy for takeover vulnerability, we find that shareholder control is associated with 
lower yields if the firm is protected from takeovers. We also find that shareholder control 
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is associated with higher yields if the firm is exposed to takeovers. The contrasting 
effects of shareholder control on yields are the strongest for firms that are small and have 
low leverage. In the presence of shareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to 
differences in takeover vulnerability can be as high as 93 basis points. 
That the bondholder reactions are related to hostile takeovers is further confirmed by 
the fact that the results are insignificant for a subsample of firms where the bondholders 
are protected from takeovers through the poison put covenant.  While losses in these 
hostile takeovers could be due to an increase in leverage, other sources of losses could 
exist and is left for future investigation. Another avenue of future research is to 
investigate the role of firm-specific control factors in bond-pricing models, especially 
since portfolios that long firms with both strong shareholder control and high takeover 
vulnerability and short firms without either shareholder control or takeover vulnerability 
generate an annualized abnormal return of 1% to 1.6% for portfolios. Finally, by showing 
that a complementary design of two governance mechanisms - shareholder control and 
takeover exposure – increases the cost of debt, the paper suggests that the design of 
different governance mechanisms should be related to the capital structure of the firm.  
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Figure 1. Timeline 
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Figure 2. Leverage changes for completed hostile takeovers 
 
The graph below shows the average leverage of firms that were hostile targets. Time 0 signifies the quarter 
during which the takeover-announcement was made. We use a sample of 16 completed hostile takeovers in 
our time period of 1990 – 1997 for which we were able to get all relevant leverage data. 
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Table 1. Number of firms and issues, percentiles of BLOCK, EXT and ATI 
The table presents the following summary statistics for the first quarters of the years 1991 to 1997 as found 
in our sample: the average number of firms and bond issues; the 25%, 50% and 75% percentiles of the 
percentage of shares held by the largest institutional blockholder (minimum 5%, BLOCK); the 25%, 50% 
and 75% percentiles of the shareholder rights index EXT (see Gompers, Ishi and Metrick (2003)); and 
finally the percentages of firms in the four anti-takeover index (ATI) groups. 
 
                                  Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 
       
Number of Firms  365 431 473 402 452 449 411 
Number of Issues 1596 2003 2141 1717 1895 1863 1655 
Issues/firm 4.37 4.65 4.53 4.27 4.19 4.15 4.03 
 
       
25% percentile of largest block 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
50% percentile of largest block 5.35% 5.20% 5.47% 5.22% 5.42% 5.81% 6.11% 
75% percentile of largest block 8.78% 7.74% 7.99% 7.84% 8.73% 9.02% 9.25% 
 
       
25% percentile of % EXT   12 13 12 12 13 12 12 
50% percentile of % EXT   14 15 15 14 14 15 14 
75% percentile of % EXT   16 17 17 16 17 16 16 
 
       
% of firms with ATI = 0 32.0% 29.2% 30.6% 31.9% 31.6% 34.0% 33.6% 
% of firms with ATI = 1 26.4% 27.5% 28.5% 34.0% 33.5% 35.8% 37.0% 
% of firms with ATI = 2 37.1% 38.6% 35.8% 30.5% 30.8% 24.9% 24.4% 
% of firms with ATI = 3 4.6% 4.6% 5.1% 3.6% 4.1% 5.3% 5.0% 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of EXT, ATI, BLOCK, LEV 
The table presents the correlations of the following six variables, all pooled across time and firms: the 
shareholder rights indices ATI and EXT; the existence of an institutional blockholder BLOCK-holder; the 
market capitalization (SIZE); and the industry-adjusted leverage (LEV); and the firm’s RATING. The 
higher the value for RATING, the lower the expected bankruptcy probability. Specifically, we use S&P 
ratings categories on a scale from 22 to 2, with e.g. AAA = 22, BB+ = 12  and C = 2. 
 
  EXT ATI BLOCK SIZE LEVERAGE 
ATI 65.77%     
BLOCK -6.73% -3.99%    
SIZE -0.13% -1.34% -24.50%   
LEVERAGE -3.26% -3.60% 15.22% -1.04%  
RATING 1.15% 0.18% -29.69% 56.64% -26.18% 
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Table 3, panel A. Effect of shareholder control on bond spreads: ATI 
Reported are the pooled OLS regression coefficients plus their t-statistics in parentheses of regressing 
monthly corporate bond spreads on the governance variables ATI and BLOCK (see Table 1 for a 
description), a constant (omitted), plus a set of controls, where TTM denotes the bond’s time to maturity in 
years, C is a dummy for callability, and CR2 to CR7 are dummies for rating categories AA+ to B-. 
Dummies indicating the 33% of largest/smallest firms are Ilarge and Ismall, those indicating the 33% of firms 
with highest and lowest leverage are Ihighlev and Ilowlev. Our sample includes an average of 1,839 bonds per 
year from 1990 to 1997, with on average 4.3 corporate bond issues per firm. 
 
                       MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
BLOCK 0.01   -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 -0.24 
 
(0.73)   (-7.24) (-6.89) (-7.20) (-6.98) 
ATI  0.06  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
 (7.67)  (-0.78) (-1.08) (-0.76) (-0.94) 
ATI*BLOCK   0.04 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 
 
  (6.81) (8.30) (7.02) (7.41) (7.78) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge     -0.01   
 
    (-0.51)   
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall     0.12   
 
    (9.74)   
ATI*BLOCK*Ihighlev      0.01  
 
     (1.11)  
ATI*BLOCK*Ilowlev      0.001  
 
     (0.06)  
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge, highlev       -0.02 
 
      (-1.65) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge, lowlev       -0.02 
 
      (-1.42) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall, highlev       0.07 
 
      (4.79) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall, lowlev       0.10 
 
      (4.80) 
LEVERAGE 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.36 
 
(7.67) (7.64) (7.40) (8.07) (8.77) (6.47) (7.89) 
LN ASSETS -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 
 
(-6.24) (-6.87) (-5.94) (-6.80) (-4.84) (-6.73) (-5.71) 
TTM -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-1.30) (-0.88) (-1.32) (-1.37) (-1.18) (-1.38) (-1.27) 
SENIOR -0.021 -0.013 -0.018 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 
 
(-0.97) (-0.58) (-0.83) (-0.26) (-0.03) (-0.32) (-0.11) 
SENIOR SECURED -0.28 -0.31 -0.28 -0.30 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 
 
(-11.16) (-12.18) (-10.93) (-11.87) (-11.15) (-11.65) (-11.45) 
C 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69 
 
(43.87) (43.92) (44.08) (43.94) (44.01) (43.93) (43.86) 
CR2 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 
 
(1.98) (2.03) (2.08) (2.21) (2.19) (2.23) (2.23) 
CR3 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 
 
(5.02) (5.36) (5.07) (5.47) (5.37)  (5.50) (5.42) 
CR4 0.77 0.80 0.76 0.79 0.75 0.80 0.77 
 
(10.41) (10.78) (10.29) (10.72) (10.19) (10.76) (10.44) 
CR5 2.1769 2.21 2.16 2.21 2.11 2.22 2.16 
 
(27.89) (28.31) (27.79) (28.36) (26.92) (28.38) (27.59) 
CR6 4.38 4.40 4.36 4.40 4.22 4.40 4.30 
 
(52.57) (52.96) (52.42) (52.84) (49.82) (52.81) (50.69) 
CR7 10.88 10.89 10.85 10.87 10.65 10.87 10.73 
 
(59.00) (59.11) (58.89) (59.05) (57.56) (59.04) (58.02) 
adjusted R2 37.54% 37.63% 37.61% 37.74% 37.92% 37.74% 37.81% 
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Table 3, panel B. Effect of shareholder control on bond spreads: ATI + fixed issuer 
effects 
Reported are the pooled OLS regression coefficients plus their t-statistics in parentheses of regressing 
monthly corporate bond spreads on the governance variables ATI and BLOCK (see Table 1 for a 
description), a constant, a set of controls (see panel A), plus issuer dummies. Only the results for the 
governance variables are reported. Dummies indicating the 33% of largest/smallest firms are Ilarge and Ismall, 
those indicating the 33% of firms with highest and lowest leverage are Ihighlev and Ilowlev. Our sample 
includes an average of 1,839 bonds per year from 1990 to 1997, with on average 4.3 corporate bond issues 
per firm. 
 
                       MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
BLOCK 0.07   -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 
 (4.16)   (-3.61) (-3.39) (-3.59) (-3.47) 
ATI  0.06  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  (2.79)  (0.86) (0.57) (0.83) (1.00) 
ATI*BLOCK   0.04 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.12 
   (6.38) (5.69) (6.63) (6.03) (6.18) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge     -0.09   
 
    (-7.67)   
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall     0.18   
 
    (12.61)   
ATI*BLOCK*Ihighlev      -0.04  
 
     (-3.58)  
ATI*BLOCK*Ilowlev      0.01  
 
     (0.78)  
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge, highlev       -0.07 
 
      (-5.57) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge, lowlev       -0.05 
 
      (-3.12) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall, highlev       0.05 
 
      (2.96) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall, lowlev       0.19 
 
      (7.82) 
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Table 4. Effect of shareholder control on bond spreads: EXT 
Reported are the pooled OLS regression coefficients plus their t-statistics in parentheses of regressing 
monthly corporate bond spreads on the governance variables EXT and BLOCK (see Table 1 for a 
description), a constant, a set of controls (see Table 3, panel A). Only the results for the governance 
variables are reported. Dummies indicating the 33% of largest/smallest firms are Ilarge and Ismall, those 
indicating the 33% of firms with highest and lowest leverage are Ihighlev and Ilowlev. Our sample includes an 
average of 1,839 bonds per year from 1990 to 1997, with on average 4.3 corporate bond issues per firm. 
 
                       MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
BLOCK 0.01   -0.32 -0.37 -0.32 -0.33 
 
(0.73)   (-4.49) (-5.17) (-4.49) (-4.62) 
EXT  0.009  -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 
 (3.44)  (-1.03) (-1.37) (-1.02) (-1.18) 
EXT*BLOCK   0.002 0.023 0.027 0.022 0.024 
 
 
 (2.27) (4.71) (5.39) (4.53) (4.87) 
EXT*BLOCK*Ilarge     -0.004   
 
   
 (-2.99)   
EXT*BLOCK*Ismall     0.01   
 
   
 (6.61)   
EXT*BLOCK*Ihighlev      0.0001  
 
     (0.03)  
EXT*BLOCK*Ilowlev      0.002  
 
     (1.00)  
EXT*BLOCK*Ilarge, highlev       -0.006 
 
      (-3.32) 
EXT*BLOCK*Ilarge, lowlev       -0.001 
 
      (-0.40) 
EXT*BLOCK*Ismall, highlev       0.009 
 
      (3.76) 
EXT*BLOCK*Ismall, lowlev       0.011 
 
      (3.39) 
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Table 5. Effect of shareholder control on ratings: ATI 
Reported are the results from an ordered probit model to relate corporate bond ratings to the governance 
variables ATI and BLOCK (see Table 1 for a description), a constant (omitted), plus a set of controls, 
where TTM denotes the bond’s time to maturity in years and C is a dummy for callability. Dummies 
indicating the 33% of largest/smallest firms are Ilarge and Ismall, those indicating the 33% of firms with 
highest and lowest leverage are Ihighlev and Ilowlev. We first estimate the probit regressions across bonds per 
quarter and the report the time series average of the coefficients and their t-statistics between parentheses. 
We use a 7-way classification representing S&P ratings (closest to) AAA, AA, BBB, BB, B, CCC, and 
lower. Our sample includes an average of 1,839 bonds per year from 1990 to 1997, with on average 4.3 
corporate bond issues per firm. 
 
                       MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
BLOCK -0.48   -0.11 -0.19 -0.10 -0.21 
 (-18.44)   (-2.03) (-3.38) (-1.92) (-3.52) 
ATI  0.10  0.20 0.22 0.20 0.22 
 
 (10.13)  (11.02) (10.64) (10.99) (10.95) 
ATI*BLOCK   -0.15 -0.18 -0.23 -0.31 -0.22 
 
  (-12.86) (-6.93) (-7.92) (-9.91) (-7.28) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge     0.33   
 
    (20.70)   
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall     -0.43   
 
    (-27.91)   
ATI*BLOCK*Ihighlev      0.17  
 
     (5.89)  
ATI*BLOCK*Ilowlev      0.24  
 
     (8.70)  
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge, highlev       0.41 
 
      (14.51) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge, lowlev       0.39 
 
      (12.53) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall, highlev       -0.45 
 
      (-17.84) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall, lowlev       -0.33 
 
      (-9.94) 
LEVERAGE -1.61 -1.76 -1.69 -1.64 -1.67 -1.64 -1.72 
 
(-14.55) (-15.56) (-15.17) (-14.54) (-14.32) (-16.48) (-16.53) 
LN ASSETS 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.05 
 
(9.23) (10.39) (10.39) (7.78) (-0.21) (7.91) (2.27) 
TTM 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(11.04) (13.05) (11.13) (13.38) (15.53) (12.56) (14.10) 
SENIOR 0.36 0.37 0.33 0.38 0.30 0.40 0.31 
 
(5.01) (4.51) (4.61) (4.93) (4.49) (5.02) (3.92) 
SENIOR SECURED 0.43 0.51 0.50 0.40 0.22 0.45 0.27 
 
(5.23) (6.07) (6.39) (4.85) (3.32) (5.49) (3.59) 
C -0.32 -0.31 -0.32 -0.33 -0.28 -0.33 -0.28 
 
(-9.02) (-9.16) (-8.67) (-9.30) (-10.90) (-9.19) (-9.98) 
Model χ2 3536.94 3596.43 3558.47 3513.74 3283.96 3464.54 3297.80 
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Table 6. Effect of shareholder control on ratings: EXT 
Reported are the results from an ordered probit model to relate corporate bond ratings to the governance 
variables EXT and BLOCK (see Table 1 for a description), a constant and a set of controls (see Table 5). 
Only the results for the governance variables are reported. Dummies indicating the 33% of largest/smallest 
firms are Ilarge and Ismall, those indicating the 33% of firms with highest and lowest leverage are Ihighlev and 
Ilowlev. We first estimate the probit regressions across bonds per quarter and the report the time series 
average of the coefficients and their t-statistics between parentheses. We use a 7-way classification 
representing S&P ratings (closest to) AAA, AA, BBB, BB, B, CCC, and lower. Our sample includes an 
average of 1,839 bonds per year from 1990 to 1997, with on average 4.3 corporate bond issues per firm. 
 
                       MODEL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
BLOCK -0.48   0.51 0.94 0.47 0.75 
 (-18.44)   (5.06) (7.35) (4.83) (6.65) 
EXT  0.06  0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 
 
 (18.90)  (21.36) (20.18) (20.86) (20.74) 
EXT*BLOCK   -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 
 
  (-15.65) (-8.91) (-11.63) (-11.27) (-11.58) 
EXT*BLOCK*Ilarge     0.05   
 
    (24.19)   
EXT*BLOCK*Ismall     -0.07   
 
    (-24.33)   
EXT*BLOCK*Ihighlev      0.03  
 
     (6.30)  
EXT*BLOCK*Ilowlev      0.04  
 
     (7.96)  
EXT*BLOCK*Ilarge, highlev       0.06 
 
      (12.00) 
EXT*BLOCK*Ilarge, lowlev       0.07 
 
      (13.40) 
EXT*BLOCK*Ismall, highlev       -0.08 
 
      (-18.61) 
EXT*BLOCK*Ismall, lowlev       -0.05 
 
      (-9.22) 
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Table 7. Abnormal returns of long-short bond portfolios 
Reported are the annualized mean excess returns and the annualized abnormal return of several long-short 
bond portfolios. We use the Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995) four-factor bond-pricing model to calculate 
abnormal returns. In Panel A (B), the portfolios buy all bonds of firms with and short bonds of firms 
without a blockholder, either unconditional or conditional on the level of ATI (EXT). Here, the levels of 
ATI and EXT refer to the levels of their categories, not their precise respective values. Further, in Panel C 
(D), the portfolios buy all bonds of firms with the highest category of ATI (EXT) and short bonds of firms 
in the lowest ATI (EXT) category, either unconditional or conditional on the existence (BLOCK = 1) or the 
absence (BLOCK = 1) of a blockholder. Both equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios are used. 
 
EW long-short portfolios   VW long-short portfolios  
         
Panel A: Long blockholder, short no blockholder, using ATI 
         
Mean Alpha t-stat ATI  Mean Alpha t-stat ATI 
1.19 1.25 3.44 All  1.10 0.67 2.74 All 
         
0.81 0.82 1.31 1  0.57 0.55 1.33 1 
1.15 1.36 3.25 2  0.94 0.43 1.41 2 
1.49 1.34 2.35 3  1.65 0.91 1.99 3 
         
Panel B: Long blockholder, short no blockholder, using EXT 
         
Mean Alpha t-stat EXT  Mean Alpha t-stat EXT 
0.65 0.77 1.67 1  1.23 0.84 2.24 1 
1.05 1.27 2.66 2  0.70 0.55 1.45 2 
1.80 1.63 2.94 3  1.37 0.69 1.56 3 
         
Panel C: Long high ATI, short low ATI      
         
Mean Alpha t-stat BLOCK  Mean Alpha t-stat BLOCK 
0.39 -0.01 -0.02 All  -0.31 -0.35 -1.24 All 
         
0.05 -0.22 -0.35 0  -0.83 -0.51 -1.60 0 
0.73 0.30 0.51 1  0.24 -0.15 -0.29 1 
         
Panel D: Long high EXT, short low EXT      
         
Mean Alpha t-stat BLOCK  Mean Alpha t-stat BLOCK 
0.04 0.27 0.57 0  -0.10 0.04 0.13 0 
1.19 1.13 2.32 1  0.04 -0.12 -0.21 1 
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Table 8. Regressing bond alphas on size, leverage, levels of ATI, EXT and BLOCK  
Reported are the results for the weighted-least-squares regressions of annualized bond alphas on size-
leverage dummies (in panel A), and on the level of the governance variables ATI, EXT and BLOCK 
(denoted by ‘BL’) conditional on size and leverage (in panel B). For a description of these governance 
variables, see Table 1. The dummies indicating the 33% of largest/medium/smallest size firms are
 
Ilarge, Imed 
and Ismall, and the dummies indicating the 67% and 33% of firms with lowest and highest leverage are Ilow 
and Ihigh. The levels of ATI and EXT refer to the levels of their categories, not their precise respective 
values. We use the Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995) four-factor bond-pricing model to calculate alphas. The 
alphas are those of the 54 portfolios of bond issues created by 3 x 2 x 3 x 3 sorts on ATI (or EXT) x 
BLOCK x SIZE x LEV. All portfolio returns are equally-weighted. Finally, we report the regression 
coefficients plus their t-statistics between parentheses, and the R2 and the adjusted R2 are given for each 
regression as well. 
 
Panel A – Mispricing  
 
Using ATI x BLOCK x SIZE x LEV sorted bond portfolios 
  
          
Ismall,low Imed,low Ilarge,low Ismall,high Imed,high Ilarge,high   R2 adj. R2 
0.79 0.47 0.14 2.34 0.20 0.25   23.90% 15.97% 
(2.20) (1.54) (0.53) (2.33) (0.66) (0.95)     
 
Using EXT x BLOCK x SIZE x LEV sorted bond portfolios 
  
          
Ismall,low Imed,low Ilarge,low Ismall,high Imed,high Ilarge,high   R2 adj. R2 
0.92 0.83 0.33 5.18 0.66 0.68   42.06% 36.03% 
(3.05) (3.85) (1.82) (6.89) (2.49) (2.66)     
          
   Panel B – The effect of Size 
 
   Using ATI x BLOCK x SIZE x LEV sorted bond portfolios 
  
          
ATI*Ismall ATI*Imed ATI*Ilarge    Ismall,low Ismall,high R2 adj. R2 
0.77 0.16 0.04    -0.49 1.07 26.44% 18.78% 
(2.98) (2.10) (0.56)    (-1.11) (1.06)   
          
BL*Ismall BL*Imed     BL*Ilarge    Ismall,low Ismall,high R2 adj. R2 
1.35 0.25 0.02    -1.25 1.45 37.24% 30.71% 
(5.08) (2.08) (0.19)    (-3.07) (1.64)   
  
        
 Using EXT x BLOCK x SIZE x LEV sorted bond portfolios   
          
EXT*Ismall EXT*Imed EXT*Ilarge    Ismall,low Ismall,high R2 adj. R2 
1.08 0.08 -0.08    -1.28 3.25 45.65% 39.99% 
(3.67) (1.15) (-1.28)    (-2.70 4.07)   
          
BL*Ismall BL*Imed     BL*Ilarge    Ismall,low Ismall,high R2 adj. R2 
0.89 0.10 0.04    -0.55 3.05 42.49% 36.50% 
(3.04) (0.81) (0.33)    (-1.32 3.51)   
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Table 9. Regressing bond alphas on the Minimum(ATI/EXT , BLOCK) 
Reported are the results for the weighted-least-squares regressions of annualized bond alphas on the 
Minimum of the level of ATI and BLOCK (in Panel A) or of EXT and BLOCK (in Panel B), conditional 
on size and leverage. For a description of these governance variables, see Table 1. The dummies indicating 
the 33% of largest/medium/smallest size firms are
 
Ilarge, Imed and Ismall, and the dummies indicating the 67% 
and 33% of firms with lowest and highest leverage are Ilow and Ihigh. The levels of ATI and EXT refer to the 
levels of their categories, not their precise respective values. We use the Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995) 
four-factor bond-pricing model to calculate alphas. The alphas are those of the 54 portfolios of bond issues 
created by 3 x 2 x 3 x 3 sorts on ATI (or EXT) x BLOCK x SIZE x LEV. All portfolio returns are equally-
weighted. Finally, we report the regression coefficients plus their t-statistics between parentheses, and the 
R2 and the adjusted R2 are given for each regression as well. 
 
Panel A: Using ATI x BLOCK x SIZE x LEV sorted bond portfolios 
 
 
Min*Ismall,low 
 
 
Min*Imed,low 
 
 
Min*Ilarge,low 
 
 
Min*Ismall,high 
 
 
Min*Imed,high 
 
 
Min*Ilarge,high 
 
 
Ismall,low 
 
               
Ismall,high 
 
 
R2 
 
 
adj. R2 
0.65 0.23 -0.09 0.79 0.05 -0.09  1.44 28.36% 17.46% 
(3.15) (1.73) (-0.82) (0.61) (0.28) (-0.69)  (0.65)   
          
Min*Ismall,low Min*Imed,low Min*Ilarge,low Min*Ismall,high Min*Imed,high Min*Ilarge,high Ismall,low Ismall,high R2 adj. R2 
1.33 0.18 -0.13 1.09 0.16 -0.07 -1.03 1.88 37.68% 26.60% 
(3.99) (1.41) (-1.21) (0.89) (1.00) (-0.54) (-2.51) (0.89)   
        
Panel B: Using EXT x BLOCK x SIZE x LEV sorted bond portfolios 
 
 
Min*Ismall,low Min*Imed,low Min*Ilarge,low Min*Ismall,high Min*Imed,high Min*Ilarge,high Ismall,low Ismall,high R2 adj. R2 
0.62 0.33 -0.13 2.97 0.22 0.09  0.74 45.04% 36.68% 
(2.84) (3.17) (-1.51) (2.30) (1.66) (0.90)  (0.40)   
          
Min*Ismall,low Min*Imed,low Min*Ilarge,low Min*Ismall,high Min*Imed,high Min*Ilarge,high Ismall,low Ismall,high R2 adj. R2 
1.38 0.22 -0.22 3.20 0.21 0.02 -1.09 0.86 49.02% 39.95% 
(3.94) (2.13) (-2.53) (2.64) (1.68) (0.23) (-2.67) (0.50)   
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Table 10. The Poison Put Covenant: Effect of shareholder control on bond spreads  
Reported are the pooled OLS regression coefficients plus their t-statistics in parentheses of regressing 
monthly corporate bond spreads on the governance variables ATI and BLOCK, both for the full sample as 
well as for the subset of bonds issued with a poison put. See Table 1 for a description of ATI and BLOCK. 
The regressions also include a constant, a set of controls (see Table 3, panel A) and fixed issuer effects, but 
only the coefficients of the governance variables are reported. Dummies indicating the 33% of 
largest/smallest firms are Ilarge and Ismall, those indicating the 33% of firms with highest and lowest leverage 
are Ihighlev and Ilowlev. Our full sample includes an average of 1,839 bonds per year from 1990 to 1997, with 
on average 4.3 corporate bond issues per firm. Our sample of bond issues with poison puts includes an 
average of 237 bonds per year from 1990 to 1997, with on average 1.73 corporate bond issues per firm.  
 
 ATI + fixed issuer effect 
 MODEL 4  MODEL 7 
  Full Sample Poison Put   Full Sample Poison Put 
BLOCK 
  -0.15   -0.15    -0.08   -0.10 
  (-3.17) (-0.67)  (-0.77) (-0.45) 
ATI 
   0.03    0.18     0.02    0.19 
  (1.10) (1.35)  (1.80) (1.45) 
ATI*BLOCK 
   0.08    0.04     0.01   -0.04 
  (3.87) (0.36)  (1.09) (-0.37) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge, highlev 
     -0.01    0.06 
  
   (-3.39) (0.63) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ilarge, lowlev 
     -0.00    0.04 
  
   (-0.49) (0.31) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall, highlev 
   
   0.01    0.17 
  
   (2.58) (3.15) 
ATI*BLOCK*Ismall, lowlev 
   
   0.02    0.07 
  
   (3.79) (0.77) 
Adjusted R2 7.51% 7.08%  7.56% 7.33% 
      
 
 
